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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment in a large real-world social network to examine how subjects
expect to be treated by their friends and by strangers who make allocation decisions in mod-
ified dictator games. Although recipients’ beliefs accurately account for the extent to which
friends will choose more generous allocations than strangers (i.e., directed altruism), recip-
ients are not able to anticipate individual differences in the baseline altruism of allocators
(measured by giving to an unnamed recipient, which is predictive of generosity toward named
recipients). Recipients who are direct friends with the allocator, or even recipients with many
common friends, are no more accurate in recognizing intrinsically altruistic allocators. Recipi-
ent beliefs are significantly less accurate than the predictions of an econometrician who knows
the allocator’s demographic characteristics and social distance, suggesting recipients do not
have information on unobservable characteristics of the allocator. (JEL: C73, C91, D64)
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1. Introduction
Recent research has shown that altruistic preferences are enormously heteroge-
nous: some subjects behave perfectly selfishly whereas other subjects aim for
equitable or socially efficient allocations.1 In this paper, we analyze whether an
agent’s altruistic preferences should be viewed as part of her private informa-
tion, or whether it is more appropriate to think of altruism as a publicly observed
characteristic such as gender or age.
Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals invest considerable
resources in revealing altruistic preferences: for example, research institutes,
charitable foundations, sport, and cultural facilities are frequently named after
their founders. Non-profit organizations have developed various mechanisms to
allow donors to endow department chairs at universities, assign their names to
library books and other equipment such as chairs and desks, or to be listed on a
commemorative plaque for a new building. It is an open question whether these
technologies are successful in revealing agents’ altruism. Should we think of all
this ostensible signaling as a separating equilibrium of some signaling game as
in Benabou and Tirole (2006)? If such a separating equilibrium is present, then
it must be the case that an individual’s friends know whether he or she is in fact
altruistic. In particular, the individual’s altruism should be reflected in beliefs
about the kinds of allocation decisions he or she would make. If, instead, people
are not aware of which of their friends are particularly altruistic or particularly
selfish, this suggests that such attempts at signaling are ineffective and that only
a pooling equilibrium may be feasible where agents act generously at times in
order to not be revealed as a selfish type.
It is natural to expect that an agent can observe the altruistic preferences of
a friend more easily than the preferences of a stranger. We conduct a large field
experiment within a real-world social network where we measure subjects’ beliefs
about the altruism of friends and strangers.2 In Leider et al. (2009) we show that
altruistic preferences in a social network can be decomposed into a baseline altru-
ism component and a directed altruism component. Baseline altruism describes
the intrinsic niceness of a decision maker. Directed altruism captures the fact that
conditional on the decision maker’s baseline altruism she will tend to treat friends
better than strangers. In this paper we specifically analyze to what extent agents
are aware of other people’s baseline altruism—in particular, we are interested
whether they are aware of the baseline altruism of their close friends.
1. Andreoni and Miller (2002) first documented that altruistic preferences toward strangers adhere
to standard revealed preference axioms and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) refine their
methodology by increasing the number of observations per agent.
2. A growing literature in economics has explored learning in social networks; see Calvó-Armengol
and Jackson (2004) and DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) for recent theoretical contribu-
tions and Kremer and Miguel (2007) and Rao, Möbius, and Rosenblat (2007) for examples of field
experiments on social learning.
In our experiments, we first directly measure the social network of Harvard
undergraduates to identify, for each subject, socially close direct friends, less
close friends-of-friends, and socially distant strangers. We then conduct a series
of modified dictator games where allocators make unilateral allocation decisions
for a nameless recipient (a randomly selected participant from the subject’s dor-
mitory) and, a few days later, for several types of named recipients. Participants
make multiple decisions but are paid for one decision selected at random. Our
design allows us to distinguish between baseline altruism toward nameless recip-
ients and directed altruism that favors friends over nameless recipients. We find
that allocators pass, on average, about 50% more tokens to friends compared
to nameless recipients. Moreover, the amount sent to a nameless recipient is an
excellent predictor of how much the same allocator will send in the future to a
friend: Each one-unit increase in nameless allocation translates approximately
into a one-unit increase in allocations to friends. We then measure recipients’
beliefs of how many tokens different named allocators will pass to them.3
Our main finding is that subjects are remarkably unaware of the baseline altru-
ism of people they know—including their close friends. We find that recipients’
beliefs are, on average, very well calibrated for the population as a whole: They
correctly expect that friends pass more tokens than strangers and the expected
average amounts passed are close to the actual amounts. However, recipients do
not incorporate an allocator’s baseline altruism into their prediction: They expect
more tokens from friends than from strangers but they do not expect more tokens
from generous friends compared to selfish friends. For some allocator/recipients
pairs we observe both the allocator’s action for a particular recipient as well as
that recipient’s belief for this particular allocator. We again find that recipients
have no private information about allocators’ decisions except that, on average,
they expect more tokens from friends compared to strangers. This is true even
if allocator and recipient are direct friends or even if they have many friends in
common.
Therefore, it appears that recipients have no greater knowledge about allo-
cators’ altruistic preferences in the social network than the econometrician who
has measured the social network and demographic characteristics of allocators.
Although recipients correctly expect, on average, that friends will treat them bet-
ter than strangers they are unaware of the considerable and stable heterogeneity
in allocators’ preferences.
Our paper builds on a rich experimental literature on prosocial behavior. Most
experiments match randomly selected subjects anonymously in the lab4 and are
therefore unsuitable to study the recipient’s beliefs about socially close allocators.
3. Although we want to measure the effect of the network structure on beliefs, we never explicitly
refer to social distance in instructions, but rather prompt recipients by the names of allocators.
4. See Camerer (2003) for an extensive survey.
A number of studies measure beliefs after revealing certain demographic char-
acteristics about allocators such as gender (Slonim and Garbarino 2008; Aguiar
et al. 2009), ethnicity (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001), and work place or address
(Glaeser et al. 2000). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to measure
recipients’ beliefs in a real-world social network. In Leider et al. (2009) we con-
duct other experiments with the same subject pool to distinguish directed altruism
between socially close subjects from norms of reciprocity that are supported by
the repeated super-game played between subjects in the social network. In subse-
quent research, Goeree et al. (2008) use our design to measure directed altruism
in a school network of teenage girls (also see Brañas-Garza et al. (2006) for exper-
imental data with European university students). Although these studies confirm
our findings of directed altruism, they do not measure beliefs about expected
generosity of others. In an important methodological advance, our experiment
was completely Web-based. This ensured a very high participation rate of 71%,
which was crucial for generating a good social network map, as well as a sufficient
number of matches between direct friends during the course of the experiment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is
described in Section 2. Section 3 summarizes the main features of the data. In
Section 4 we show that recipients have no knowledge of allocators’ altruistic
preferences. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our results
and avenues for future research.
2. Experimental Design
Our design has two stages: a network measurement stage, and a dictator game
stage. Each allocator in the dictator game stage made multiple allocation decisions
for six different recipients but was paid only for one randomly selected decision
at the end of the experiment.5 Similarly, each recipient submitted multiple beliefs
for seven different potential allocators but was paid only for the accuracy of one
of her predictions.
2.1. Network Measurement
To measure the social network, we used a coordination task to provide subjects
incentives to truthfully report their friendships. Each subject listed her 10 best
friends and the average amount of time per week she spends with each of them.6
5. The decisions were selected such that each recipient was also only paid once. This was explained
to all participants.
6. The choices were 0–30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, 1–2 hours, 2–4 hours, 4–8 hours, or more
than 8 hours.
For each listed friend who also listed the subject, the subject was paid 50 cents
with probability 0.5 if their answers about time spent together disagree, or with
probability 0.75 if they agree. We made the expected payoff (25 or 37.50 cents)
large enough to give an incentive to list their friends truthfully and small enough
to discourage “gaming.” The randomization was included to limit disappointment
if a subject was only named by a few people. To define the social network, we
say that two subjects have a direct link if one of them named the other person.
We call this type of social network the “OR-network.”7
2.2. Allocators
After measuring the social network, we randomly assigned each subject the role
of allocator or recipient in the dictator games.8 Each allocator received an e-mail
invitation with a link to a Web site where she could play modified dictator games
with a nameless recipient randomly selected from the allocator’s dormitory.9
The allocator was asked to divide 50 tokens between herself and the recipient
under three different token-money exchange rates (for the allocator, and recipient,
respectively). In the first condition giving is efficient, each token is worth 10 cents
to the allocator, but is worth 30 cents to the recipient (an exchange rate of 1:3);
in the second condition giving is neutral, each token is worth 20 cents to the
allocator and 20 cents to the recipient (an exchange rate of 1:1); lastly, in the third
condition giving is inefficient, each token is worth 30 cents to the allocator and
only 10 cents to the recipient (an exchange rate of 3:1).
A few days later, all allocators were invited by e-mail to participate in a
second round, in which they are matched with five different named recipients
listed using their full real first and last names: (i) a direct friend (social distance
SD = 1), (ii) a friend of a friend (SD = 2), (iii) a friend of a friend of a friend
(SD = 3), (iv) a student in the same staircase/floor who is at least distance 4
removed from the student (SD ≥ 4), and (v) a randomly selected student from
the same dormitory who falls into none of the other categories.10 In each case,
the allocator was asked to make allocation decisions under the three different
exchange rates for each recipient. To control for experimenter demand effects of
7. We find similar results when we use the “AND-network”, where a link exists only if both subjects
name each other. The OR-network definition has desirable monotonicity properties: A subject with
an above-average number of actual friends will have an above-average number of friends in the
measured network even when the network survey truncates his true network. This is not always true
for the AND-network if truncation forces subjects to randomly select from a set of equally close
friends.
8. In the experimental instructions, we referred to the two roles simply as player 1 and player 2.
9. The allocator is told in the instructions that the recipient was selected from her dormitory.
10. Our selection algorithm used the “AND”-network definition for this step. Because social dis-
tance always (weakly) decreases when using the “OR”-social distance definition the number of
observations for columns (1) to (4) in Tables 1 and 2 are not equal.
presentation, we randomized both the order and the grouping (by social distance)
of subjects’ decisions.
Note that each allocator made 18 decisions (3 decisions for the nameless and
5 named recipients). All these decisions were anonymous: Neither the recipient
nor the allocator was told which of the decisions was selected for payment. On top
of this, allocators also made 18 non-anonymous decisions: They were identical to
the anonymous decisions except that both allocator and recipient were informed
if one of these decisions was selected for payment. In this paper we report only
on anonymous decisions, because we want to explain beliefs, and these are the
decisions we have beliefs for.11 The large number of decisions made it very
difficult for a participant to infer which of her anonymous decisions was selected
for payment.12
2.3. Recipients
We measured recipients’ beliefs of how many tokens five different named alloca-
tors would pass to them in the anonymous treatment.13 Recipients in the network
population received an e-mail invitation to participate in a single Web-based
experiment where the recipient was asked to predict how many tokens, out of
50 total tokens, five different allocators (whose real names were presented to the
recipient) would pass to the recipient under each of three exchange rates (1:3,
1:1, and 3:1) in the anonymous treatment. For each recipient we chose the five
allocators in the same way as we assigned recipients to allocators: one randomly
selected direct friend, one friend of a friend (SD = 2), one friend of a friend of
a friend (SD = 3), a student in the same staircase/floor who is at least distance 4
removed from the student, and a randomly selected student from the same dor-
mitory who falls into none of the other categories.14 The recipient was told that
at most one of these 15 decisions would be selected for payment.
For each token above or below the actual allocation, 10 cents were subtracted
from the recipient’s earnings. Therefore, the recipient had incentives to report
his median belief (see Möbius and Rosenblat 2006). In many lab experiments,
beliefs are more commonly elicited using a quadratic loss function which provides
11. In Leider et al. (2009) we examine (and compare) both the anonymous and non-anonymous
decisions in order to explain the determinants of allocator choices.
12. Although in principle the allocator could reveal her allocation to the recipient after the exper-
iment in the anonymous case, because the allocator was not told which decision was selected for
payment, she would have had to make choices with unique payoffs so that she would know which
recipient to inform, and remember those choices several weeks later when payments were made.
13. We also asked recipients how many tokens two named allocators would pass to two other named
recipient. Therefore, each recipient submitted beliefs for seven different allocator/recipient pairs but
only in five out of these seven cases was the recipient himself. We are not using data from the other
two pairs in this paper.
14. Due to this selection procedure, if a recipient was asked to submit a belief for a particular
allocator then the allocator did not necessarily submit a decision for that recipient (and vice versa).
incentives for subjects to reveal mean beliefs (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker 2007;
Huck 2002). For the sake of keeping the instruction for our online experiment as
simple as possible we opted for an absolute deviation loss function. Because we
are primarily interested in studying how recipients change their beliefs to account
for the social distance and the baseline altruism of different allocators, we are not
concerned about this difference.
3. Data Description
3.1. Subject Pool
In December 2003, Harvard sophomores, juniors, and seniors at two dormitories
were recruited through posters, flyers, and mail invitation. Experimental earnings
were added to the students’ electronic cash-cards.15 Subjects who logged onto
the Web site were asked to (i) list their best friends’ names using the coordination
task and (ii) fill in a basic demographic questionnaire. Subjects were required
to name friends from the two participating dormitories. Subjects were paid their
earnings from the coordination task, plus a flat payment of $10 for completing
the survey. They were also eligible to earn cash prizes in a raffle, adding $3 (on
average) in earnings.
In those two dormitories, 569 of the 806 students, or about 71%, participated
in the social network survey. The survey netted 5,690 one-way links. The resulting
“OR”-network consists of a single connected component with 802 subjects. Fifty-
one percent (51%) of subjects in the baseline survey were women; 49% were men.
Thirty-one percent (31%) of the subjects were sophomores, 30% were juniors,
and 39% were seniors.
The dictator game stage was conducted over a one-week period in May 2004.
Half of all subjects who participated in the coordination stage were randomly
selected to be allocators. Out of 284 eligible allocators invited, 193 participated
in round 1 (decisions for nameless recipients) and 181 participated in round 2
(decisions for named recipients). Participants were representative of the coordi-
nation stage sample composition: 58% were women, 28% were sophomores, 28%
were juniors, and 44% were seniors. The corresponding statistics for recipients
are similar.
3.2. Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the average allocations in the three dictator games. It is appar-
ent that across all exchange rates allocators’ generosity toward the recipient
15. These cards are widely used on campus as a cash substitute, and many off-campus merchants
accept the cards.
Table 1. Summary statistics for allocators’ choices in dictator games.
Anonymous Treatment
SD = 1 SD = 2 SD = 3 SD = 4 SD = 5 Nameless
Dictator Game (n = 206) (n = 286) (n = 312) (n = 97) (n = 4) (n = 193)
Ex. Rate 1:3 19.19 16.80 15.14 12.20 12.50 17.42
(19.64) (19.30) (18.79) (15.47) (25.00) (18.21)
Ex. Rate 1:1 11.96 10.79 9.39 8.79 6.25 11.61
(13.53) (12.68) (11.89) (10.25) (12.50) (12.83)
Ex. Rate 3:1 8.03 7.28 5.66 6.15 0.00 8.31
(13.55) (12.88) (11.10) (10.72) (0.00) (13.23)
Table shows averages of number of passed tokens by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in paren-
theses. Nameless refers to matches between the allocator and the recipient where the identity of the recipient is not known
to the allocator.
decreases with social distance. With a 1:3 exchange rate, allocators pass about
19.19 tokens to a direct friend versus 12.20 tokens to a recipient at social distance
4. With an exchange rate of 3:1, the allocator passes only 8.03 versus 6.15 tokens,
respectively.
We can interpret allocations to nameless recipients as allocators’ baseline
or unconditional generosity, because the allocator has no information about the
recipient. Our data replicates the well-known finding of Andreoni and Miller
(2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) that individuals are highly het-
erogenous in their unconditional altruism. In particular, we also find that many
subjects are perfectly selfish: In the three exchange rates, 28%, 46%, and 64% of
subjects pass zero tokens, respectively.
Recipients’ beliefs are reported in Table 2. Beliefs are fairly accurate and
correctly anticipate the effect of greater social distance.16 Beliefs are most
accurate when altruism is efficient (1:3 exchange rate). When altruism is inef-
ficient, recipients expect allocators to be somewhat more generous than they
actually are.
4. Results
4.1. Allocator Altruism
We begin by examining the determinants of allocators’ decisions, to obtain an
estimate of baseline and directed altruism. This will provide a benchmark we can
later use for comparison with the recipients’ beliefs. We report the estimates for
16. Comparing recipient beliefs to actual allocations with a non-parametric signed-rank test we
find significant differences only for the 3:1 exchange rate with distance 3 (p = 0.007) and distance 4
(p = 0.021), as well as marginal significance for the 1:1 exchange rate with distance 3 (p = 0.053).
For all other comparisons p > 0.20.
Table 2. Summary statistics for recipients’ expectations in dictator games.
Anonymous Treatment
SD = 1 SD = 2 SD = 3 SD = 4 SD = 5
Dictator Game (n = 262) (n = 371) (n = 401) (n = 140) (n = 2)
Ex. Rate 1:3 17.08 13.09 12.64 12.46 25.00
(15.84) (14.22) (14.84) (12.83) (14.14)
Ex. Rate 1:1 16.14 13.84 11.15 12.85 22.50
(12.06) (11.77) (11.30) (11.82) (3.54)
Ex. Rate 3:1 13.65 11.94 8.86 11.71 22.50
(14.49) (13.86) (12.68) (14.34) (3.54)
Table shows averages of number of expected tokens by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
a simple linear empirical model of altruism in social networks taken from our
earlier paper on allocator decisions (Leider et al. 2009):17
Allocation = α × demographic characteristics
+ γ1 × social distance + γ2 × nameless allocation + ε.
(1)
The dependent variable is the number of tokens passed by the allocator. The
parameter γ1 captures the importance of directed altruism and γ2 captures the
importance of the nameless decision (baseline altruism) in predicting allocations
to named recipients.
We exploit the fact that we observe five decisions for each allocator which
allows us to estimate equation (1) using random effects. We also use Tobit regres-
sions to take account of the fact that allocations are bounded below by zero and
above by 50.18 We control for the social distance between allocator and recipient
by including dummy variables SD1 (meaning a direct friend) to SD4 with SD4
as omitted category. The estimated coefficient on SD1 should therefore be inter-
preted as the number of extra tokens that the allocator passes to a direct friend
compared to a distant recipient in the anonymous treatment, and the estimated
coefficient on SD2 captures directed altruism toward a friend of friend.
The estimates are reported in Table 3. Odd-numbered columns show estimates
where we only control for social distance and even-numbered columns include
demographic controls for participants’ age, gender, whether they live in the same
entryway, as well the allocator’s baseline altruism to nameless recipients. The
two variables that consistently and strongly predict how generously an allocator
treats a recipient in her social network are social distance and generosity toward
nameless recipients.
17. Our model is a natural extension of existing preferences-based altruism models: Andreoni
(1990) models altruism as “warm glow,” whereas Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002) focus on preferences over payoff distributions.
18. Our results are very similar when we estimate equation (1) using standard random effects or
fixed effects GLS.
Table 3. Allocators’ actions in the anonymous treatment when paired with five recipients at
various social distances.
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SD1 9.029 9.915 6.010 6.244 7.936 8.838
(2.331)∗∗∗ (2.357)∗∗∗ (1.388)∗∗∗ (1.485)∗∗∗ (1.935)∗∗∗ (2.066)∗∗∗
SD2 1.308 1.974 1.819 2.192 4.077 4.623
(2.304) (2.331) (1.365) (1.458) (1.886)∗∗ (2.014)∗∗
SD3 −1.340 −0.961 0.366 0.756 3.583 4.337
(2.296) (2.304) (1.361) (1.443) (1.887)∗ (2.002)∗∗
Pass to nameless 1.384 1.186 1.403
(0.136)∗∗∗ (0.116)∗∗∗ (0.164)∗∗∗
Allocator is male 0.708 −2.833 −5.578
(4.547) (2.779) (4.052)
Recipient is male −.651 −.024 −0.977
(1.335) (0.838) (1.165)
Same entryway/house 0.732 −0.517 0.381
(1.376) (0.877) (1.223)
Allocator is junior −16.356 −5.507 −6.920
(6.196)∗∗∗ (3.730) (5.365)
Allocator is senior −10.614 −5.181 −8.317
(5.654)∗ (3.415) (4.917)∗
Recipient is junior 0.965 0.802 1.663
(1.842) (1.152) (1.593)
Recipient is senior 2.640 0.911 0.536
(1.651) (1.046) (1.459)
Const. 4.326 −10.130 −1.838 −9.253 −18.845 −18.679
(3.813) (5.680)∗ (2.286) (3.559)∗∗∗ (3.547)∗∗∗ (5.000)∗∗∗
Obs. 901 836 901 836 901 836
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens passed by the allocator in
the dictator games. “Pass to nameless” denotes the number of tokens the allocator passed to nameless recipients. Omitted
distance is SD4. All specifications are estimated as Tobit regressions with allocator random effects. The coefficients on
SD1 are significantly different from SD2 at the 5% level for all columns.
Observation 1. Allocators who give more to nameless recipients also give
more to specific named recipients. The pass-through is close to 1.
Across all three exchange rates, each one-token increase in generosity toward
a nameless recipient is associated with a 1.19- to 1.40-token increase in generos-
ity toward a named recipient. Because the nameless and the named allocations
were elicited several days apart, this continuity indicates a substantial degree of
stability in the heterogeneity of allocators’ altruistic preferences over time. More-
over, the fact that estimated pass-through from nameless to named allocations is
close to 1 vindicates our interpretation of an allocator’s nameless allocation as
her baseline altruism.19
19. D’Exelle and Riedl (2008) find very similar results with a different subject pool and a modified
definition of baseline altruism. They consider village networks in Nicaragua and measure giving to
strangers in another village instead of giving to a random person from the same social network (as
in our paper). Additionally, as in our results, they find that the amount givent to strangers is similar
to the amount given to friends-of-a-friend.
Observation 2. Close social ties induce directed altruism. Allocations to
friends are at least 50% higher than allocations to nameless recipients.
Moreover, social distance also matters greatly: Allocators are substantially
more generous to direct friends than to less socially close recipients. Generosity
decreases quickly and monotonically with social distance, although the estimated
coefficients on SD2 and SD3 are not significantly different from each other for
all games. In terms of magnitudes, allocators pass at least 50% more tokens to
friends than to nameless recipients.
Observation 3. Gender, years in college, and geographic proximity do not
predict allocation decisions.
Interestingly, demographic characteristics have, for the most part, no signif-
icant effect: The allocator’s and recipient’s gender, as well as their geographic
proximity, have no significant effect on generosity.20 However, the signs of the
estimated gender coefficients of the allocator are consistent with the work of
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), who found that men are more likely to exhibit
social-surplus maximizing preferences: They are more generous in dictator games
when giving is efficient and less generous when giving is inefficient. College
juniors are somewhat more selfish than are sophomores and seniors; however,
most of the coefficients on the class dummies are insignificant.21
4.2. The Determinants of Recipient Beliefs
We next look to recipient beliefs to examine what factors determine recipient
beliefs. Because we do not observe both an allocator choice and a recipient belief
for every pairing, we will first look at the general pattern of beliefs. One way
to consider the accuracy of recipient beliefs given the general mechanisms that
determine generosity is to reframe the previous section as the econometrician’s
predictions based on a model of the dictator game calibrated from allocation
choices, knowledge of the structure of the social network, and demographic char-
acteristics. We can then ask whether recipients’ beliefs correctly account for social
ties and/or the intrinsic generosity of the allocator. We also examine whether
recipients are able to make better predictions than the econometrician (due to any
potential private information about unobserved characteristics of the allocator).
20. Our experiment includes only a limited number of demographic variables. However, our results
are consistent with the results reported in Goeree et al. (2008), who include a much wider range of
demographic variables.
21. We also ran a version of the even-numbered specifications which included dummy variables
if the number of subjects who had listed the allocator or the recipient, respectively, as a friend was
higher than the median. These were not significant for any of the three dictator games.
Table 4. Recipients’ expectations in the anonymous treatment of dictator game when
predicting the actions of five allocators at various social distances.
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SD1 10.904 10.840 5.737 5.469 6.178 6.365
(1.714)∗∗∗ (2.362)∗∗∗ (1.407)∗∗∗ (1.927)∗∗∗ (2.034)∗∗∗ (2.573)∗∗
SD2 4.752 6.263 3.123 3.490 2.858 3.863
(1.637)∗∗∗ (2.258)∗∗∗ (1.347)∗∗ (1.845)∗ (1.947) (2.487)∗
SD3 1.736 2.815 −0.804 −.658 −1.006 0.058
(1.641) (2.278) (1.350) (1.853) (1.960) (2.486)
Pass to nameless 0.031 0.062 0.035
(0.035) (0.043) (0.057)
Allocator is male −2.041 −2.769 −4.152
(1.238)∗ (1.017)∗∗∗ (1.352)∗∗∗
Recipient is male 4.064 −0.408 −0.531
(2.984) (2.066) (3.034)
Same entryway/house −1.833 −1.174 −2.157
(1.354) (1.126) (1.523)
Allocator is junior −1.065 −1.141 −1.436
(1.851) (1.547) (2.081)
Allocator is senior −0.145 −0.749 2.611
(1.737) (1.429) (1.928)
Recipient is junior −5.712 −3.870 −6.620
(4.027) (2.797) (4.087)
Recipient is senior 0.717 −0.977 −5.133
(3.554) (2.479) (3.629)
Const. 6.148 4.617 9.314 11.928 3.363 8.736
(1.970)∗∗∗ (3.785) (1.483)∗∗∗ (2.830)∗∗∗ (2.223) (4.021)∗∗
Obs. 839 563 839 563 844 567
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens expected by the recipient in
each dictator game. “Pass to nameless” denotes the number of tokens the allocator passed to nameless recipients. Omitted
social distance is SD4. All specifications are estimated as Tobit regressions with recipient random effects. The coefficients
on SD1 are significantly different from SD2 at the 5% level for all columns.
We assume that recipients use the same linear model of equation (1) as the
econometrician but we estimate it using recipients’ beliefs instead of allocators’
actions as dependent variable. We also specify random effects on the recipient
level (rather than on the allocator level), because our experiment provides us with
multiple observations for each recipient.
The odd- and even-numbered columns in Table 4 report our estimates with
and without additional covariates. Recipient beliefs are significantly higher for
direct friends (SD = 1) than for strangers, and, interestingly, beliefs are also
significantly higher for friends of friends (SD = 2) when giving is efficient
(as well as being marginally significant when giving is neutral or inefficient).
Recipients do not, however, have different beliefs based on the baseline altruism
of the allocator. In order to compare the effect of social distance and allocator type
on beliefs to the effect on giving, we conduct a Wald test whether the coefficient
estimates in the beliefs regression (from Table 4) are equal to the closest point in
the 95% confidence interval for the corresponding coefficient from the allocation
regression (Table 3).22
Result 1. Recipients’ beliefs are well calibrated to directed altruism.
The number of extra tokens that recipients expect from their direct friends
(SD = 1) is quite close to the actual number of extra tokens allocators pass to
their direct friends—in all cases the estimated coefficient is within the 95% con-
fidence interval of the allocation estimate. Although recipients are in general too
optimistic about friends of friends when giving is efficient or neutral (expecting
the generosity of allocators to increase by almost twice the actual amount), the
beliefs coefficients are within the allocation confidence interval for all six speci-
fications. Similarly, the coefficient for SD = 3 is not significantly different from
the allocation estimates (p > 0.65 in all cases). Thus it appears that recipients are
making approximately accurate adjustments to their beliefs for the strength of the
social tie they have with the allocator. In contrast, however, recipients essentially
ignore allocators’ baseline altruism.
Result 2. Recipients are unaware of allocators’ baseline altruism.
In all belief regressions the estimated coefficients on nameless decisions are
not only quite close to zero, they are also significantly different from the allo-
cation estimates (p < 0.001 for all three exchange rates). Thus, whereas each
token given to a nameless recipient increases actual giving to named recipients
by nearly 1, recipients’ beliefs essentially do not differ at all between allocators.
Thus, although recipients do account for the aggregate effect of social distance,
they do not seem to be able to anticipate the individual heterogeneity in baseline
altruism. Another way to demonstrate that recipients are not making sufficient
distinctions between their direct friends is to examine, for recipients that make
predictions for more than one direct friend, whether the predicted allocations dif-
fer as much as they ought to given the distribution of actual allocations. For each
recipient who made a prediction for two or more direct friends we calculate the
difference between their largest prediction and their smallest. Similarly, for each
recipient where we observe more than one allocation from a friend, we calculate
the difference between the largest and smallest allocation. Although we do not
observe enough recipients with both enough predictions and enough allocations,
we can compare the distributions. For all three dictator games the median differ-
ence in beliefs is much smaller than the median difference in allocations, namely,
22. We are not aware of another method to more directly test the equality of two coefficients from
two Tobit regressions with different dependent variables. We believe that considering the whole
confidence interval is a conservative way of accounting for the precision of the choice estimates.
a recipient’s predictions for her friends are too similar.23 In the 1:3 dictator game
the median difference for beliefs was 5 while the median for allocations was 20
(ranksum test: p < 0.01); for the 1:1 game the median for beliefs was 5 and
for allocations was 24 (p < 0.01); in the 3:1 game the medians were 3.5 and
12, respectively (p = 0.07). Moreover, for all three games the distribution of
differences for actions first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of dif-
ferences for beliefs, that is, the differences in beliefs are too small throughout the
distribution.24
Lastly, as in the allocation estimates, none of the other demographic and geo-
graphic covariates matter except for the allocator’s gender: recipients expect male
allocators to be significantly less generous when giving is neutral (1:1 exchange
rate), and especially when giving is inefficient (3:1 exchange rate). Again, this
result is consistent with Andreoni and Vesterlund’s (2001) findings. Moreover,
the estimated gender effect is not significantly different than the estimates from
the allocation regression (the estimates are contained in the confidence interval
in all cases).
4.3. Accuracy of Recipient Beliefs
Having interpreted the allocation estimates as econometric predictions, one way
that we can assess the overall accuracy of recipient beliefs is to compare the
mean squared error between predictions and action for the econometrician and
the recipient, because for 204 out of the 563 matches between a specific recipient
and an allocator we observe both a prediction and the allocator’s actual choice.
If the recipient were using some knowledge about the specific allocator to make
her prediction that was not available to the econometrician, then we may expect
recipient predictions to be more accurate than the econometrician. However, for all
three exchange rates the mean square error is approximately twice as large for the
recipient beliefs as from our fitted model of allocator behavior25 (MSE(1:3) 448
vs. 758; MSE(1:1) 156 vs. 280; MSE(3:1) 173 vs. 351)—a significant difference
in all cases (p < 0.001 in a signed rank test).26 Moreover, even if we restrict
attention to allocations by direct friends (SD = 1), where the recipient is most
23. If, instead, recipients were aware of the allocators’ baseline altruism but simply did not believe
that baseline altruism would affect giving to named recipients, then we ought to observe recipients
making substantially different predictions for different direct friends.
24. We use the stochastic dominance test from Anderson (1996) using 10 equally spaced partitions.
For the 1:3 DG the test statistic is χ2(9) = 25.1 with p < 0.01; for the 1:1 DG χ2(9) = 24.2 with
p < 0.01; for the 3:1 DG χ2(9) = 19.0 with p = 0.03.) Similar results obtain if we instead use the
standard deviation in beliefs/allocations as our measure of differentiation.
25. We use the specifications reported in the even-numbered columns which include all the
demographic information.
26. If, instead, we use the predictions from the odd-numbered columns, which include only social
distance, the recipient beliefs perform similarly poorly.
Table 5. Accuracy of recipients’ beliefs.
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pass to nameless 0.275 0.322 0.162 0.141 0.407 0.378
(0.055)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.085)∗ (0.074)∗∗∗ (0.077)∗∗∗
Pass to nameless × SD1 −0.149 0.073 0.099
(0.153) (0.174) (0.099)
SD1 7.442 10.570 −1.304 −2.334 6.770 5.805
(3.397)∗∗ (4.391)∗∗ (2.126) (2.898) (2.764)∗∗ (3.067)∗
SD2 4.382 4.670 −3.835 −3.959 2.413 2.212
(3.117) (3.143) (1.954)∗∗ (1.990)∗∗ (2.334) (2.352)
SD3 3.687 3.855 −2.294 −2.460 3.756 3.600
(3.036) (3.065) (2.016) (2.035) (2.465) (2.471)
Const. 11.831 10.830 13.053 13.402 5.244 5.607
(2.727)∗∗∗ (2.863)∗∗∗ (1.895)∗∗∗ (2.002)∗∗∗ (2.134)∗∗ (2.157)∗∗∗
Obs. 190 190 190 190 194 194
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the
number of tokens expected by the recipient and the actual number of tokens passed by the allocator. “Pass to nameless”
denotes the number of tokens the allocator passed to nameless recipients. Omitted social distance is SD4. All specifications
are estimated as OLS regressions with recipient random effects.
likely to have better information than the econometrician, the recipients still make
significantly larger errors (MSE(1:3) 549 vs. 896, p = 0.02; MSE(1:1) 193 vs.
297, p = 0.02; MSE(3:1) 238 vs. 514, p < 0.01).
For the matches where we observe both a prediction and a choice, we can
identify which matches had the most inaccurate predictions. We regress the abso-
lute difference between prediction and actual choice on social distance and the
number of tokens the allocator sent to a nameless recipient, and report these results
in the odd-numbered columns of Table 5.
Result 3. Recipients made larger mistakes for highly altruistic allocators,
underestimating their choices.
Across all three dictator games, prediction errors were significantly increasing
in the baseline altruism of the allocator. That is, recipients were much more
accurate in predicting the choices of relatively selfish allocators than relatively
altruistic allocators. In particular, when giving was efficient or neutral subjects
were significantly more likely to underestimate (rather than overestimate) the
choice of highly altruistic allocators (p < 0.01 for a signed-rank test of prediction
errors for allocators with the highest quartile of baseline altruism). Conversely,
subjects were significantly more likely to overestimate the allocations of the most
selfish allocators in all three dictator games (for allocators in the lowest quartile of
baseline altruism p < 0.01 in all cases). The effect of social distance on errors is
mixed: Low social distance leads to significantly larger errors in the efficient and
inefficient dictator games, whereas it leads to smaller errors when giving is neutral.
One might expect that recipients are better at observing the behavior, and thus
inferring the preferences, of direct friends compared to socially more distant allo-
cators. Therefore, we re-estimate our empirical model and include an interaction
term between the allocator’s nameless decision and the social distance dummy
SD1. The results are reported in the odd-numbered columns of Table 5 (without
demographic and geographic covariates).
Result 4. Stronger social connections do not increase recipients’ awareness
of allocator’s baseline altruism.
We do not find evidence that direct friends make significantly smaller mis-
takes in predicting the actions of highly altruistic allocators than strangers do;
in fact, in two of the specifications the interaction term is positive.27 Thus it
seems that direct friends are not any better at avoiding errors due to individual
heterogeneity in the altruism of allocators.28
If being a direct friend is not a sufficient source of information to success-
fully identify highly altruistic allocators, we consider whether other measures of
social connection might identify subjects who are aware of individual differences
between allocators. As an alternative measure, we consider maximum network
flow, defined as the number of unique paths (of distance two or less) between the
allocator and recipient (Karlan et al. 2009). This measure captures the number of
common friends the two subjects share (plus one if they are also direct friends)
and is also a measure of network closure (Coleman 1990). One may expect that
subjects may be most informed about individuals that they are more densely
connected to in their circle of friends. Therefore, we regress absolute prediction
errors on network flow and allocator baseline altruism; the results are presented
in the odd-numbered columns of Table 6. For ease in interpreting an interaction
between network flow and allocator altruism, in the even-numbered columns we
replace the continuous measure of flow with a dummy variable denoting subjects
with a network flow at least as large as the median flow (among pairs with non-
zero flow). In all specifications, prediction errors are significantly increasing in
the allocators’ baseline altruism. Errors do not significantly differ based on the
network flow between the allocator and recipient, nor are the errors of high flow
27. Although the interaction term is negative (i.e., a smaller increase in errors for altruistic subjects),
the large main effect of being a direct friend means the total effect is positive for all allocators (and
significant for allocators up to the 65th percentile of altruism).
28. We also considered whether recipients were more accurate in accounting for the altruism of
direct friends when both subjects said they spent at least 2–4 hours a week together (compared
to recipients who are direct friends of the allocator but spend less time together). However, when
we regressed prediction errors on a dummy for time spent together, allocator altruism and term
interacting time together with altruism, the interaction term was not significantly negative for any of
the games. Although the errors were significantly increasing in baseline altruism only for who spent
a lot of time together in the neutral and inefficient games, there was also a negative main effect on
errors of the time spent together. The overall effect was not consistent across games.
Table 6. Accuracy of recipients’ beliefs.
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pass to nameless 0.275 0.291 0.175 0.161 0.391 0.367
(0.066)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗ (0.086)∗ (0.075)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗
Pass to nameless × −0.048 0.039 0.077
Network flow ≥ 9 (0.147) (0.163) (0.177)
Network flow 0.290 −0.106 0.095
(0.217) (0.128) (0.147)
Network flow ≥ 9 2.613 −1.394 0.642
(3.451) (2.206) (2.044)
Const. 14.773 15.310 11.102 11.041 8.514 8.767
(1.939)∗∗∗ (2.043)∗∗∗ (1.297)∗∗∗ (1.313)∗∗∗ (1.265)∗∗ (1.226)∗∗∗
Obs. 190 190 190 190 194 194
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the
number of tokens expected by the recipient and the actual number of tokens passed by the allocator. “Pass to nameless”
denotes the number of tokens the allocator passed to nameless recipients. “Network flow ≥ 9” denotes a dummy variable
that equals one if the network flow measure is at least nine. All specifications are estimated as OLS regressions with
recipient random effects.
recipients affected less by the allocator’s baseline altruism.29 Thus it appears that
even subjects who have dense social connections with the allocator are not aware
of which allocators are highly altruistic.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we ask subjects how they expect to be treated by other specific indi-
viduals in their social network who make allocation decisions in dictator games.
In comparing these beliefs to the actual decisions made by the allocator, subjects
appear remarkably unaware of even their direct friends’ altruism. Although they
take social distance into account when forming expectations (correctly anticipat-
ing that friends are more generous than strangers) they ignore baseline altruism
(allocations to unnamed recipients), which is an excellent predictor of actual
allocation choices within the social network. Thus it may be more likely that indi-
viduals prefer to interact with friends in anticipation of benefiting from directed
altruism, rather than because they want to deal with people they know to generally
be very generous.
Additionally, our results put one piece of our motivating evidence in a differ-
ent light: We observed in the Introduction that nonprofits often allow donors to
attach their name to scholarships, endowments, or buildings, which might suggest
that signaling is also a common phenomenon in social networks. Instead, these
organizations might provide this type of “signaling service” precisely because it
29. Although the interaction term for the efficient dictator game is negative, the combined
coefficient is still significantly positive.
is difficult for individuals to signal their altruistic preferences to other members
of their social network.
Our findings also provide some preliminary evidence against the notion that
friends actively seek out altruistic friends. Such a strategy would require knowl-
edge about other peoples’ baseline altruism. All the same, we document in Leider
et al. (2009) that friends do cluster by baseline altruism (i.e., subjects who are altru-
istic allocators are more likely to have friends who are altruistic allocators, and
selfish allocators are more likely to be friends with selfish allocators). These two
observations suggest an interesting question for future research: Do our friends
shape our social preferences (treatment effect), or do we seek out friends with
similar social preferences (selection effect)? Although the results of this paper
point in the direction of the former, direct evidence for the treatment effect could
help explain to what extent the distribution of preferences, as observed in the
lab by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), is
endogenous.
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